into the slave trade in 1788, African merchants received goods on credit from the slave ships "for the purpose of slaving those ships, on whose account they travel. These are in a particular predicament, being obliged to leave a pledge or security for their return. This pledge consists of their own relations, who are detained till they come back."'13 The use of human pawns to secure goods advanced against the delivery of slaves represented, we believe, an extension of local credit arrangements to British ship captains enabling them to enforce repayment of debts in compliance with customary law.14 Moreover, as pawns were subject to possible transport and sale in the Americas should they be unredeemed, ship captains were sometimes faced with making judgments about whether or not to sail with pawns instead of waiting for slaves to be delivered. The comment of Bristol slave trader Richard Rogers that is cited at the beginning of this article suggests that pawns were more likely to survive the Middle Passage than slaves brought from the interior, thereby tempting ship captains to sail with pawns rather than wait for delivery of slaves, despite the underlying premise prohibiting the shipment of pawns from the port. Hence Rogers's comment that "Pawns Will Live when Slaves is Apt to Dye" reveals a complex structure of credit and a mechanism for enforcement of the contracts implicit in slave transactions at Old Calabar, with those being held as pawns providing apparently good security for credit because of their connections with local traders. This institutional adjustment brought some alleviation of the risks to British traders of advancing credit at Old Calabar while allowing local merchants to compete for access to commercial credit. Pawnship, therefore, underpinned the expansion of slaving at Old Calabar before 1807. Once Britain abolished its slave trade and then sought to develop other forms of trade with the port, different mechanisms had to be found to secure credit relations.
To consider the impact of British credit on commercial institutions at Old Calabar, it is first necessary to examine the historical context of the slave trade there in the eighteenth century. We will then describe the extent to which a relatively few merchants in Bristol and Liverpool, on the one side, and Old Calabar, on the other, dominated the trade in slaves. This oligarchical structure, we argue, promoted personal interaction and resulted in longstanding relationships based on business, education, and friendship, but by itself was insufficient to provide the security necessary to allow British merchants to "trust" goods on credit to their counterparts at Old Calabar. We then consider how local institutions, notably the male secret society, Ekpe, and human pawnship (in Efik, the word is ubion),15 were modified as debt-enforcing agencies at the port, allowing British merchants to advance goods on 13 credit with greater confidence than would otherwise have been the case. Finally, we explore the implications of the Old Calabar case for our understanding of British commercial and financial relations with the Atlantic world from the mid-eighteenth century.
UNTIL THE 1740s, THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA was a minor source of slaves for the transatlantic trade as a whole. Biafran slaves only constituted about 6 percent of the slave trade as a whole early in the eighteenth century, but the Bight of Biafra became a leading source of slaves, especially for the British trade, by the end of the century, when it accounted for 20 percent of the trade.16 Annual shipments of slaves probably amounted to less than 3,000 in most years during the first three decades of the eighteenth century but then rose rapidly, increasing over fourfold from the 1730s to the 1760s, or from about 34,100 in 1731-1740 to about 152,100 in 1761-1770 (see Table) . The trade peaked in the 1780s, when an estimated 175,400 slaves left the Bight, but then began slowly to decline up to and beyond British abolition in 1807 before experiencing a final resurgence between 1820 and 1840. Shipments of slaves from the Bight almost totally collapsed after 1840. About 900,000 slaves were shipped to the Americas during the height of the British trade from the 1740s through 1807. This represented about 60 percent of the total number of slaves, estimated at perhaps 1.5 million, who embarked on ships in the Bight of Biafra during the whole period of the slave trade. Although British merchants took an increasing share of the slave trade on many parts of the African coast in the eighteenth century, the expansion of British trade was most heavily concentrated in the Bight of Biafra. Of the slaves known to have 16 It is evident from shipping data that merchants residing in Liverpool and Bristol provided the bulk of credit advances that fostered the large expansion in slave shipments from Old Calabar between 1740 and the 1780s. It is also evident, however, that merchants at Old Calabar were not the only ones in the Bight of Biafra to gain by such advances, as merchants from the same two British ports dominated other ports in the region, notably Bonny.20 Given this dominance, British abolition of slaving in 1807, though perhaps anticipated by well-connected merchants at the coast, still brought some disruption to commercial relations and credit movements at ports in the region. Unfortunately,. evidence relating to the commercial relations between the British and local merchants at other ports in the Bight of Biafra is, at present, much weaker than for Old Calabar. Therefore, we concentrate on the management of credit at Old Calabar in the period 1750-1807 and, to a lesser extent, during the transition to palm oil trading following British abolition. The growth of palm oil exports attracted British merchants again, as A. J. H. Latham, Kannan Nair, and more recently Martin Lynn have shown, but in advancing goods to local traders they now had to find ways of protecting credit that differed from those used in the era of the slave trade. Associated with the leopard, Ekpe has been well described in the anthropological literature as a masquerade and an exclusively male secret society that was divided into a series of grades under a chief priest/official, the Eyamba. Each grade, the number of which appears to have increased during the past three hundred years, required payment of dues to be a member, the highest grade costing the most.66 Members of the most senior grade shared the income from dues of all grades among themselves. Wealthy individuals could purchase more than one share or finance the memberships of junior kin, thereby capturing a higher proportion of the income from dues.
According to Monday Efiongh Noah, those who introduced Ekpe tried to transform $he society into an "effective governmental institution" that enabled the different wards to interact and thereby resolve disputes.67 He concedes, however, that the effectiveness of Ekpe was only achieved with difficulty, especially since the society was initially associated with one ward, Old Town. Indeed, the foundation of Duke Town, also referred to as New Town, by settlers from Creek Town, apparently around 1748, appears to have been an attempt to counteract the influence of Old Town and its control of Ekpe. Inter-ward conflict, much of it doubtless related to struggles for control of Ekpe itself as well as access to the taxes and fees of slave ships, continued into the 1750s and 1760s, the decades of the great expansion in the trade. The most obvious manifestation of this tension was the 1767 massacre, after which Old Town, and presumably its domination of Ekpe, was undermined. Thereafter, Duke Town came to control Ekpe and to manipulate it for its own political and commercial ends, even securing the appointment of the younger Duke Ephraim to the office of Eyamba.68
By the 1790s, virtually all males at Old Calabar were being forced to purchase membership in Ekpe, if they did not join willingly. Those individuals who were not members of the society but were in the streets when ekpe was being "run" were punished, usually by whipping. In "running ekpe" through the different wards, the "grand council" turned the Ekpe society into a type of protection racket, akin in its operation to organizations like the Mafia, and with its religious functions seemingly subordinated to commercial and political ends. In the nineteenth century, political conditions allowed the society to function in the way that Noah describes and to become a more effective debt-policing agency.
As residents of Henshaw Town noted in a brief history sent to George Offer and Company of Liverpool in 1877, the different wards lived separately, "each under its own laws except in the line of Egbo [Ekpe]. "69
Despite political intrigue and commercial rivalry, Ekpe allowed the principal merchants "to put in force any law that may exist and to punish offenders."70 Whether for debt enforcement or other things, the society's council had the power to "blow" ekpe, that is, impose summary justice on offenders, which could involve seizure and sale into slavery or execution of the accused and his family.71 Often, Ekpe held families collectively responsible for the actions of its members. The ability to impose sanctions and otherwise enforce its decrees was assisted through the reduction to writing of the nsibidi sign language, which consisted of a series of over five hundred signs. Although it is not clear when nsibidi were first used, the spread of Ekpe, together with its rituals and symbols, required mechanisms for announcing decrees that resulted in the evolution of the system. Nsibidi were drawn on calabash gourds and walls, and signs were placed on roadways. By the end of the nineteenth century, at least, Ekpe members sometimes kept accounts and held court proceedings in nsibidi. Other things being equal, British shippers tried to obtain a high ratio of pawns to slaves. In April 1788, Richard Rogers reported trying to achieve a ratio of two pawns for every three slaves to be delivered to his ship, the Pearl; he was not alone in expecting such a ratio.86 While ship captains naturally tried to increase their leverage over local dealers, Old Calabar merchants equally preferred a low ratio. slave suppliers. Credit arrangements at Old Calabar were therefore consistent with ''economizing on transactions costs," but they also placed at risk the kin of local traders.88 As John Ashley Hall observed in 1790, relatives were "always particularly anxious" about their fate and "seemed much distressed whenever they took up an idea that the ship would sail away with the pawns."89 The fate of pawns was, then, more than simply a question of protecting friends, relatives, and dependents; it went to the heart of debt enforcement. Much depended on the personal bond or trust between the ship captain and local merchants and, for those Liverpool and Bristol firms trading regularly to the region, between the ship captains and their employers. Since, however, ship captains were not always reliable, Old Calabar merchants had to find ways of safeguarding their pawns. Sailors were sometimes seized or "panyarred" to force the return of pawns.90 But the principal method by which Old Calabar merchants sought to protect their pawns was through Ekpe. Antera Duke describes occasions when "grand ekpe" was collectively "blown" against ships close to completing their loading of slaves and perhaps contemplating taking away pawns.91 Sometimes, ekpe was "blown" to force an Old Calabar merchant to replace a recalcitrant pawn, perhaps in an attempt to deter other ships from leaving with pawns. In this respect, at least, Ekpe functioned as a "merchant guild" of Old Calabar's leading traders and the principal body for coordinating local action to monitor the treatment of pawns and to safeguard the interests of the merchants who used them as collateral.
Because of the potential damage to future commercial dealings that might arise, ship captains were often reluctant to deport pawns and even transferred pawns from one ship to another in exchange for slaves to avoid carrying them away. In 1788, when Richard Rogers had sixty pawns on board the Pearl, for example, he noted that "most of the Pawns [had been] redeem'd from other ships."92 A captain close to having a full shipload of slaves had to consider the trade-offs between sailing with the pawns or waiting further for pawns to be redeemed with slave deliveries, with the risk of losing to disease slaves already purchased. Whether transfers of pawns between ships needed permission from Old Calabar merchants is unclear, although, in local practice, as far as known, such alterations in arrangements required the approval of close kin.
When deadlines passed and their patience ran out, however, ship captains were known to foreclose on debts and to sail away with pawns. In 1773, Robin John Ephraim complained that one ship had gone with his pawns, including four of his sons. 93 Fifteen years later, in 1788, the Gascoigne of Liverpool left the river with 540 slaves and pawns. Captain Cumberbach, it was said, was "oblig'd to carry off . .. 120 Pledges," and even then the debts which the ship "left behind is 100 more."94 As Richard Rogers observed, when he could "Gett my Debts in Such Cytuation" as he desired, he would give the dealers just two days to clear any outstanding debts, and "Should they not pay in that time," he would then "Borrow their pawns to sell in the West Indies."95 The idea that one might "borrow" pawns is in itself intriguing since it implies that, even after being shipped from the coast, pawns might still be redeemed, at least in theory. Be this as it may, these examples confirm contemporary suggestions that British merchants normally regarded pawns as enslavable by sale in the Americas "if their friends refuse, or are not able to redeem them."96 When pawns were taken as collateral against future delivery of slaves, ship captains tended to assume that Old Calabar merchants recognized that they were engaging in a self-enforcing contract. This point seems to have been fully acknowledged in a deposition signed by King George (Robin John Ephraim), Jno. Robin John, Otto Ephraim (Robin John Otto Ephraim), and Orrock Robin John and witnessed by John Richards and James Hargraves at Old Town on August 22, 1776: This is to certify whom it doth or may concern that the within is a True List of Debts owing by the Natives of Old Town to Captain Lace of Liverpoole, and that the Boy named Assogua was not stoped by Captain Lace as has been Reported, but was put on board by Orrock Robin John unto whom he belonged, and that Captain Lace carried him of [sic] for the within debts, because we made no application for him nor did we even offer to Redeem him whilst the ship staid in the River, as Witness our hands.97
The fact that pawns, including kin, could be and were carried away was, in the final analysis, perhaps the most powerful single incentive for Old Calabar merchants to fulfill their contracts. Given the political situation at Old Calabar at the time, resorting to human pawnship was thus probably the most effective means available to British merchants of protecting the credit that underlay slave transactions at the port in the late eighteenth century.
As A REGION, THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA was on the margin of the emergent Atlantic economy in the early eighteenth century. During the hundred years or so after 1740, however, it became a major supplier of slaves to the Americas and, in the early nineteenth century, a primary source of palm oil, a vital ingredient in some branches of British industry. Based fundamentally on slave exports, the Bight's integration into the Atlantic economy was in many aspects typical of other regions in western Africa that supplied coerced labor for American plantations and mines. Perhaps more than any other region, its links with British merchants and, more specifically, access to British capital enabled the Bight of Biafra to move from the margins of the Atlantic economy to a much more prominent position. Moreover, whereas the purchase of slaves in some parts of Atlantic Africa was associated with the establishment of European factories or forts at the coast, in the Bight of Biafra trade was conducted from ships exclusively with indigenous merchants throughout the history of the Atlantic slave trade. In this respect, slave trading in the Bight of Biafra was similar to the cross-cultural trades that arose from encounters between groups from different cultural traditions in other parts of the world. 98 We have recently been reminded by Avner Offer that in business activities "a common identity can substitute for face-to-face relations."99 Personal and family bonds can help cement "trust" between traders, as, for instance, in the case of merchants in Britain and North America from the seventeenth century onward.100 Similar bonds were also important in shaping patterns of capital investment in Britain itself during the first century of industrialization. To quote Offer again, "business credit is essentially a form of delayed reciprocity," and early industrial investment in Britain "relied primarily on funds raised locally from family, friends, and business contacts, who based their trust on family knowledge."101 The embeddedness of trust in social relations is, therefore, an important theme in the historical literature and one that has been given renewed emphasis by the application of modern microeconomic theory to history.
The history of British trade with Old Calabar provides an important cautionary tale to those who would see trust based on social relations as shaping Britain's relationship with the Atlantic world after 1740. Attempts were made by both British and Old Calabar merchants to form ties that might be seen to engender "trust," but, we have argued, these proved insufficient to allow Old Calabar slave traders to attract British credit without other, essentially institutional, forms of security for capital being created. The case of Old Calabar reminds us, therefore, that flexibility and adaptability characterized British merchant capitalism on frontiers of trade where the conditions that Granovetter and others see as prerequisites for building trust were largely absent or at best poorly embedded. Although Adam Smith noted the difficulties that Europeans faced in colonizing Africa, whose "barbarous nations" were "by no means so weak and defenseless as the miserable and helpless Americans,"'102 it was left to others such as Thomas Clarkson to discern that, in such circumstances and in the absence of British political control, institutional arrangements for protecting credit would have to serve as a substitute for trust.
In the case of Old Calabar, it was the local institution of debt pawnship that was appropriated and adapted by both British and Old Calabar traders for this purpose before 1807. Interestingly, while pawns were sometimes taken to the Americas and sold as slaves, the institution of human pawnship itself remained confined to Africa and did not become an alternative mechanism for supplying labor for the Americas. Pawnship was tied to credit, not labor, and remained effective only when pawns were in close proximity to kin and patrons. Equally, however, pawnship could serve as a useful device for protecting credit advances only where those taking human hostages were not prohibited by their own laws from taking them away from Africa. After 1807, when Britain outlawed slaving and at the same time sought to expand other trades at Old Calabar, new institutional arrangements, centering on the Ekpe society, evolved to safeguard credit. The story of British trade with Old Calabar provides insights into how the British came to dominate the "odious commerce" in enslaved Africans. More generally, however, it also reveals how, in alliance with local merchants, British merchant-investors were sometimes able to devise, in Douglass North's words, "an adaptively efficient set of institutions"'103 that, from the mid-eighteenth century, enabled them to shape the history of some parts of the Atlantic world without either formal colonization or the support of transplanted Britons overseas. 
